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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF UTAH
-~~-~----~-------------~---~--

CALLA E. JACKMAN,
Plaintiff and Appellant,
No. 18369

VSe

DALE L .. JACKMAN,
Defendant and Respondent.
-----------~-~-----~~-~-~~~--~

APPELLANT'S BRIEF
-~~~~------~------------------

Appeal from Decree for Respondent
Third District Court
Honorable Jay E. Banks, Judge

STATEMENT OF THE KIND OF CASE
This is an action in divorce that involves the
allocation of assets acquired by the parties during the marriage, alimony, support for the parties' son and attorney's
fees.
DISPOSITION IN LOWER COURT
The plaintiff-appellant, Calla E. Jackman, requested
that the trial court award her an equitable share of the assets
acquired by the parties during the marriage.

That share, the

plaintiff said, should consider the value of an interest the
defendant had in a corporation called Future Development, Inc.,

1
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and the value of the defendant's interests in two Bara projects, Bara Two Partnership Limited and Bara Industrial Park.
The defendant did not disclose the existence of any interest
in Future Development Company in the divorce proceedings, or
admit an interest in any Bara project.

The defendant denied

that he had ever owned stock in the corporation, or any interest in either of the partnerships.
The trial court, the Honorable Jay E. Banks presiding, dismissed the defendant-respondent's counterclaim and
granted a divorce to the plaintiff.

The court awarded an ap-

praisal business, Baseline Appraisal, and $13,500.00·in receivables, to the defendant-respondent, Dale L. Jackman.

The court

awarded the cash value of the life insurance, two vehicles and
a motorcycle, a $10,000.00 money market certificate, with accumulated interest, the IRA account, the parties $21,000.00 equity
in a lot in Davis County (plaintiff's exhibit 6-P) and a
$10,000.00 lien on the home to the defendant.

The court awarded

the plaintiff a 1979 Cutlass, the household furniture and furnishings, the equity in the home, subject to.the defendant's
$10,000.00 lien, $850.00 per month, as alimony, and $1,500.00
against her attorney's fees.

The plaintiff also received about

$1,000.00 against her costs.

No provision was made for the sup-

port of the parties' son, Steven Jackman, who was 18 years old
at the time of the trial.

The court awarded the plaintiff such

interest, if any, as the defendant had in Future Development

2
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Company or in the Bara partnerships, but found, as a factual
matter, that the defendant had no interest in the corporation,
or in the Bara projectse

The court concluded that there were

no undisclosed assets and decided, at the end of the case,
that the defendant had fairly testified about his holdings.
The trial court determined that the defendant, a member of
the American Institute of Real Estate Appraisers, an MAI appraiser, had a net annual income of $19,600c00 (R.151) and a
personal net worth of less than $100,000.00 (plaintiff's exhibit 6-P, R.103-105).
RELIEF SOUGHT ON APPEAL
The plaintiff asks this court to weigh the evidence,
make its own findings, and substitute its judgment for that
of the trial court.

The plaintiff asks the court to award her

one-half the proven value of the defendant's interest in Future
Development Company, and in the Bara projects, at the time the
case was filed, in cash or its equivalent.

The plaintiff fur-

ther requests that the court equitably redistribute the assets
previously divided in the Decree, and increase the alimony.
In the alternative, the plaintiff requests that the court

re~

mand the case to the trial calendar of the district court for
such further proceedings as may be required.
The plaintiff prays that this court determine a
reasonable amount for attorney's fees, for the trial and this

3
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appeal, or, in the alternative, remand the case to the district court for further proceedings in that regard.

Finally,

the plaintiff requests that this court order that further
testimony be taken, in the lower court, on the issue of continuing support for the son, Steven Jackman.
STATEMENT OF FACTS
The plaintiff, who was married to the defendant on
May 10, 1958, was fifty-seven years old when the case was
tried (R.206).

At the time of their marriage, the plaintiff

and the defendant had six children, four of whom were the
defendant Dale Jackman's, by a prior marriage, and two of whom
were the plaintiff Calla Jackman's, by a prior marriage.

The

defendant's children ranged in age from 20 months to seven
years.

The plaintiff and the defendant had a seventh child,

Steven Jackman, born to the two of them (R.207).
Mrs. Jackman was a skilled stenographer and a private
secretary; before the marriage, and was last employed as a
detail draftsman for Kennecott Copper Corporation.

The plain-

tiff gave up her employment, when the parties married, to
assume the domestic burdens and care for the children.
Mrs. Jackman was last employed in 1958 (R.212).

She testified

that the defendant had not wanted her to be employed, outside
of the home, and had asked her to remain there (R.212,213).
When the parties married, the defendant was employed
as a mortgage loan officer and district manager for the

4
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Pacific Mutual Life Insurance Company.

Mr. Jackman was em-

ployed, as a mortgage loan officer, for more than 12 years
(R.215).

The defendant trained for and acquired his apprais-

ing skills, and became an MAI appraiser, during the marriage
(R.213,214).

By the time the case was tried, the defendant

had been a Vice-President of Zion's Securities Corporation,
the Corporation that built and now operates the ZCMI Mall, the
President of Beneficial Development

Compa~y,

the President of

the Salt Lake International Center Development Company {R.215)
and, the plaintiff claimed, a director, vice-president, general
manager, construction supervisor and employee of Future Development, Inc.
The Plaintiff's Health
...............
The plaintiff's health, at the time of the trial,
was very poor.

Mrs. Jackman was hospitalized for a bowel re-

section in 1981 that delayed the trial.

During the marriage to

Mr. Jackman, the plaintiff had complications related to pregnancy, an atrophied kidney, multiple bladder infections and
inflammation, colitis, asthma and arthritis.

The plaintiff

was traumatically injured, a number of times.
broken skating.

Her elbow was

She suffered a pelvic fracture, because of a

fall on the ice, and fell and broke her coccyx.

A finger was

accidentally broken and one of the falls necessitated a repair for an inguinal hernia.

One of the injuries, involving

5
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a spiral break of the right ring finger, was, the plaintiff
testified, caused by the defendant, who twisted the finger dur1
ing an argument, until it snapped (R.218,219) .
The finger
failed to properly heal and remained visibly misshapen and
stiff when the case was tried (R.219}.
,

Since the marriage in 1958, the plaintiff has had a
biopsy at St. Mark's Hospital and a tubal ligation.
had two bladder repairs and a bladder polyps removed.

She has
She re-

quired a femoral hernia repair, and was hospitalized for problems related to phlebitis.

The plaintiff had her gall bladder

removed, in 1973, a hiatal hernia repair, a bilateral vagotomy
and a pyloroplasty.

Mrs. Jackman had tumors removed from her

finger and a foot, and a hysterectomy.

In 1980, in connection

with a third bladder repair, her physicians removed her tubes
and ovaries.

Mrs. Jackman's health history is recapitulated in

plaintiff's exhibit 3-P.
From 1978 to 1980, a three year period, the parties
incurred uncompensated medical expenses in the amount of
$10,045.00, for an average, over what the insurance paid, of
approximately $3,350.00 per year (plaintiff's exhibit 2-P}.
At least 75% of those expenses were incurred for the plaintiff's uncompensated medical needs (R.229,230).

The plaintiff

1. The plaintiff was not without fault in the incident that
resulted in the broken finger (R.218).

6
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testified that she needed $1,657.65 per month, to pay for
her expenses and take care of her medical and other requirements (plaintiff's exhibit 1-P, R.240-248).
The defendant, Dale Lo Jackman, was fifty-three
years old (R.206), and in good health, when the case was
tried.
The Defendant's Income
For the five year period that preceded the filing
of the plaintiff's lawsuit, the period from 1975 to 1979, the
defendant never earned less than $30,700.00, in any year.

In

1979, the year before the complaint was filed, the defendant
earned $48,173.00.

The defendant's claimed total earnings,

from 1975 to 1979, as reflected on the parties' tax returns,
were $195,096.21, for an average annual income of $39,019.00
(plaintiff's exhibit 7-P).

In the same five year period, the

defendant showed an increase in earnings every year.

In 1980,

the year the plaintiff filed her lawsuit, the defendant claimed
income of $32,971.00, more than $15,000.00 less than the previous year, on Baseline Appraisal Company's gross receipts of
$60,387.00.

The income reflected on the defendant's tax re-

turn, from Baseline Appraisal, was $22,323.00.

The difference

between that amount, reflected as business income, and the
$32,971.00, reflected as total income, was a real estate commission paid to the defendant, a licensed real estate broker, and

7
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a premature IRA distribution (plaintiff's exhibit 7-P).

On

a loan application filed with Valley Bank and Trust Company, on
August 7, 1979, after the defendant had terminated his employment with the Salt Lake International Center, and about a year
before the divorce was filed, the defendant, who listed himself
as self-employed, claimed an annual income of $50,000.00
(plaintiff's exhibit 15-P).
The defendant valued his business, Baseline Appraisal,
2
at $1,000.00 (R.105).
The trial court ascribed no value to
the.defendant's business, Baseline Appraisal, found that the
defendant's net income, at the time of the trial, was $19,600.00
(R.151), and awarded the plaintiff alimony of $850.00 per month.
The Defendant's Testimony About Future Development Company, Bara Two Partnership Limited
Bara
-and -the -

Industrial Park
--------

The defendant testified that he did not own, and had
never owned, any interest in Future Development Company, a
Utah corporation, in any Bara project, or in the Salt Lake International Center.
The defendant filed a Financial Declaration with
the court, under oath, on February 4, 1981 (R.103) . 3

In that

2. The business had more than $13,500.00 in receivables, and
gross receipts, in 1980, of $60,387.00.
3. The Financial Declaration filed with the Court provided as
follows: "Any false statement made hereon shall subject you to
the penalty for perjury and may be considered a fraud upon the
court 11 (R .103) .
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8

declaration, the defendant claimed a personal net wort.:1 of:
less than $100,000.00 (R.103).

th~ Fina~

all of his assets, of every kind, were disclosed in

~ate:l

cial Declaration, or in the Answers to InterrogatorieH
January 29, 1981, which are found in the record at
(R. 260) .

th~.t

The defendant testifit3d

t:·c.~re

45

The Financial Declaration did not mention B i.~a

Partnership Limited, Bara Industrial Park, or Future
ment Company (R.267).

J'~.·;o

~E-.velop

Mr. Jackman testified that be hdd no

interest in any real property that had not been prevlously disclosed, directly or indirectly, alone or with others
and no interest in any corporation (R.264).

The

(R.262,2f~),

sai

def~~daLt

=

he had not engaged in any business enterprise during t!..e le.st
five years of his marriage, excepting only Baseline l\.py :i:.a_: sal.
1

The defendant testified that he had purch3se.d
stocks or bonds, in his own name, or that of any
the period of his marriage (R. 270, 271).

oth~~,

~)

a~ring

He said he hall !!ut

sold any stocks or bonds, during the last five years

(R.~75)

and that he didn't have, and had never had, any interest in a
limited partnership (R.35,278).
In his deposition, and later in his testinony at the
trial (R.279), the defendant said he had tried to gGl into a
company to build a building (R. 283), but that he had beE:!n
able to do so, because the money for the purchase ot the
was tied up in a Money Market Certificate.

That

t··ri.~

shd~~s

ceitif~cat~,

although held in Mr. Jackman's own name, belonged, h2 ~3i~.

9
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to both he and Mrs. Jackman, and was unavailable to him for
the purchase of stock (R.280,281) . 4

Mr. Jackman testified he

had no "track record 0 or prior experience as a builder (R.313).
He testified that he had never been an employee of the company in which he had wanted to purchase shares, Future Development Company, the company that was building the new building, and denied, under oath, that he was the construction
supervisor of that company's building project in the North
Salt Lake Industrial Park (R.310).

The defendant testified

that the Future Development Company principals handled their
own building project, although he tried to get some preliminary
design in the new building.
the defendant said,

"When

it~

actually built,"

"I did hothing to it ...

11

{R.317,318).

ARGUMENT
POINT I
THE DEFENDANT FAILED TO CORRECTLY STATE
THE FACTS TO THE LOWER COURT AND THE
TRIAL COURT'S FINDINGS WERE IN ERROR
The Defendant Earned His Interest in Future Development Company
The defendant did not list Future Development Company
as one of his present or past employers in the Answers to

4.

The same Money Market Certificate was cashed in and used
by the defendant, Dale L. Jackman, during the pendency of the
divorce proceedings, without Mrs. Jackman's consent (R.506).

10
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Interrogatories filed with the court on January 29, 1981

(R.35).
Future

He was, however, the construction supervisor of
Dev~lopment

Company's project in the North Salt Lake

Industrial Park and the company's general manager.

The

de~

fendant represented that he was the construction supervisor
on September 6, 1979, in his own hand, before this lawsuit
was filed (plaintiff's exhibits 12-P, 26-P).

The defendant

also represented, again in his own hand, that he was the general manager of Future Development Company (plaintiff's exhibit 28-P).

The defendant was the only employee Future Devel-

opment Company had on April 10, 1980 (plaintiff's exhibit 13-P,
page 3).

The manager of the Group Department at Traveler's

Insurance Company testified that Dale Jackman was the only employee ever listed for group insurance, under Future

Develo~ment

Company's Plan, from September 6, 1979, the day the Group Insurance Record card was signed, to November 13, 1981, the second day of the trial (R.410).

Based on the representation that

he was an employee of Future Development Company, the defendant
collected thousands of dollars from Traveler's Insurance Company, under Future Development Company's/Group Policy.

Most

of those funds were used for the medical care required by
Mrs. Jackman.

All of that notwithstanding, the defendant de-

nied, under oath, in his testimony at the trial, and always before, that he had ever been an employee or construction supervisor for Future Development Company.

11
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

The defendant acquired the land for Future Development Company's North Salt Lake Project from Beneficial Development Company, which he had served as president.

He then han-

dled an exchange for more suitable land, for the.tract that
Future Development then used for the Industrial Park Project
(R.478, 479) .

The defendant helped to design the bu.ilding and

worked with the architects.

When Mr. Wimer, who serviced the

loan, had a problem that concerned the architects he contacted
Mr. Jackman (R.420).

The load bearing capacity of the soil was

tested, at Mr. Jackman's request, and the consulting engineer
reported to him (plaintiff's exhibit 19-P).

The defendant

brought Future Development's other principals, Mr. Martin and
Mr. Gregson, to Bettilyon Mortgage Loan, where the loan for

the project was arranged, and introduced them to Mr. Wimer, who
had not known them before (R.415,416).

The defendant applied

for the construction loan, as general manager for Future Development Company (plaintiff's exhibit 28-P), and furnished Bettilyon
Mortgage Loan with information that it then furnished to the
lender, Old Stone Bank in Providence, Rhode Island (R.422-424).
The defendant signed the Construction Agreement, between the
owner and the contractor, for Future Development Company, on
January 31, 1980 (plaintiff's exhibit 38-P), and personally
guaranteed the construction loan, in the amount of $285,000.00,
on March 3, 1980 (plaintiff's exhibit 29-P).

The defendant

12
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Jackman approved and accepted the mortgage loan commitment for
the corporation (plaintiff's exhibit 27-P).
The defendant approved and paid the bills on the
project (plaintiff's exhibit 24-P).

He signed and authorized

all of the change orders (plaintiff's exhibit 22-P) and the
contractor accounted to him (plaintiff's exhibit 23-P).

When

the contractor needed authority to locate a transformer, he
contacted.the defendant (plaintiff's exhibit 29-P).

When cor-

respondence was required, it went to the defendant (defendant's
exhibit 41-D).
The closing documents were sent to the defendant
(plaintiff's exhibit 37-P), and he received the Certificate of
Occupancy from the City of North Salt Lake (plaintiff's
exhibit 40-P) •
The defendant was the person authorized to lease the
property (plaintiff's exhibit 18-P).

Mr. Jackman leased the

newly constructed building, on a long term lease, for
$1,407,900.00.

He handled the amendments to the lease (plain-

tiff's exhibit 55-P) and the Subordination

Ag~eement

(plain-

tiff's exhibit 56-P).

on

January 21, 1981, the defendant argued with the

lender about the interest charged on the completed project
(plaintiff's exhibit 20-P).

on

January 27, 1981, two days

before the defendant signed the Answers to Interrogatories,
under oath (R.35), and less than one week before the defendant

13
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signed the sworn Financial Declaration he filed with the
court (R.103), the defendant personally guaranteed the permanent loan on Future Development Company's North Salt Lake
Project in the amount of $285,000.00.

5

The defendant's

guarantee of the permanent loan followed the completion ·of
the construction of the project, and the issuance of a cer·tificate of occupancy on August 29, 1980, by at least five
months, and occtirred long after the final bills were paid.
In addition to that, the defendant managed and collected the
rent for 80 storage units owned by Future Development Company
in the City of Bountiful (R.379.

See plaintiff's exhibit

35-P, item 5).
The defendant was.fully engaged by Future Development Company from the time he applied for the construction
loan, some time in 1979, until he personally guaranteed the
permanent loan on January 27, 1981, after the divorce was filed.
The preceding facts must be read with an eye on the representations made in defendant's Answers to Interrogatories, in his
deposition, and at the trial.

But for Baseline Appraisal, the

defendant said, he had not been involved in any business enterprise, alone or with others, for the last five years of his

5. The loan the defendant guaranteed on January 27, 1981,
was more than three times larger than the net worth he
claimed on his Financial Declaration dated February 3, 1981
(R.103).
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marriage (See, as representative, R.44, Answer to Interrogatory
number 39).
The defendant testified that he received no compensation for his work for Future Development
lot of exercisen (R.309).

Company~

only "a

For the· services just described, the

defendant reflected.no incQme, of any kind, on his tax returns
for the years 1978, 1979

an~

1980, and no income in 1981, to

the date of the trial (R.305-307).
The defendant was Future Development Company's realtor6
a director of the corporation, its appraiser, developer, genera! manager and construction supervisor.

He was the corpora-

tion's experienced loan officer and architect in residence, its
leasing agent, its executive vice-president and only employee.
Dale Jackman earned the one-third interest in Future Development
Company that we shall later see he told Valley Bank he owned. 6
The Defendant Acquired Interests in Two Bara Projects
The defendant testified he had never been in a
limited partnership, and said he had never terminated 2.£ discontinued any business arrangements (R.44,45,326).

6. Mr. Jackman's associate, Gordon S. Gregson, valued his
own one-third interest in Future Development Company at
$120,000.00 on July 31, 1980. (Statement of Financial Condition, Gordon s. Gregson, July 31, 1980, plaintiff's exhibit
33-P).
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The plaintiff's Complaint was filed on October 8,
1980.

The plaintiff's Interrogatories were answered by the

defendant on January 29, 1981 (R.33), and were filed, with
the court, the following day.

The defendant's Financial Dec-

laration was prepared on February 3, 1981, and filed on February 4 (R.103).

The documents filed by the defendant did not

mention Future Development Company, Bara Two Partnership Limited or the Bara Industrial Park.

Mr. Jackman mentioned an

apprentice appraiser (R.324), an Iraqi National named Nazih
Mahmood (R.323), in his deposition, but did not mention any "agreementsu with Mr. Mahmood, or any interest in any Bara
project.

Mr. Mahmood, it was later discovered, was the mana-

gerial person for as many as ten Bara corporations and ten
Bara limited partnerships involved in projects in the Salt
Lake Valley, or the State of Utah (R.324).
On August 25, 1981, more than ten months after the
lawsuit was filed, after the Interrogatories were answered,
the depositions taken, and long after the Financial Declaration was submitted to the court, the defendant's counsel sent
a letter and two agreements, plaintiff's proposed exhibit 9-P
and plaintiff's exhibits 10-P and 11-P, to plaintiff's counsel.
The defendant's attorney indicated that Mr. Jackman had previously testified that he had agreements with Mr. Nazih Mahmood

16
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that were not in writinq (R.355).

7

Mr. Dolowitz indicated

that the defendant had now spoken with Mr. Mahmood, and had
determined that such agreements had been put in

wr~ting,

al-

though the defendant, who had signed them both, had not remembered that (R.337,338).

It was further asserted, at the

trial, that. Mr. Mahmood, who did not testify, and Mr. Jackman,
considered the written agreements between Mr. Jackman and
Bara Two Partnership Limited and Bara Industrial Park to be
terminated or abrogated (R.339).
The Bara Agreements, exhibits 10-P and 11-P, furnished ten months after the lawsuit was filed, came only seven
days after plaintiff's counsel filed a Request for Production
of Documents (R.128) and Interrogatories (R.134).

The Inter-

rogatories required the defendant to furnish information pertaining to the defendant's involvement with specific Bara
.projects (R.134,135).
The trial court refused to admit Mr. Dolowitz' cover
letter, which is contained with the transcript on appeal as
plaintiff 1s· proposed exhibit 9-P.

The defendant's attorney

stipulated to the admission of the exhibit, but the court refused to allow it (R.338).

It would be easier to

exp~ain

what

7. A careful examination of Dale Jackman's deposition shows
that the defendant made no such representations about Mr. Mahmood
or any Bara project.
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occurred here, if the court had not sustained its own objection to the proposed exhibit, or if plaintiff's counsel had
followed through and insisted upon the proffer of proof counsel requested that the court permit him to make (R.339).

In

any event, the failure to admit the cover letter that accompanied the tardy submission of the two exhibits, 10-P and

11-P~

and that contained. an explanation that conflicted with the
testimony of the defendant, at ·the trial, was legal error.
Some of the facts contained in the omitted exhibit, those referred to in this section, are found in the record, beginning
at page 333.
Bara I
--Plaintiff's exhibit 10-P is the first of two agreements.

It is between. BARA TWO, N.V., a Netherlands Antilles

corporation (the "Corporation"), BARA TW"O PARTNERSHIP LIMITED,
a Utah limited partnership (the Partnership") and Dale L.
Jackman.

The agreement reflects the entire understanding of

the parties and may only be modified by an agreement in writing.

It is ·dated July 1, 1980, and is seven pages long.

It

was prepared by Mr. Dolowitz' law firm and is signed by all of
the parties, in the case of the Bara ucorporation

11

and· "Partnership,"

by Nazih M. Mahmood, as managing director of BARA TWO, N.V.,
the "Corporation

11

and "General Partner."
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The agreement notes that Jaclanan has rendered services to the partnership worth $40,000.00,

8

in connection with

its acquisition of certain unimproved real property in Davis
County.

Mr. Jackman

~oaned

the money back to the partnership,

and received, in lieu-of interest on the loan, an assignment
of 4% of the net profits.

The defendant was not required to

make any contributions to the capital of the corporation, but
did agree to be available, in consideration of the interest
assigned to him, "for consultation.fl
11

In consideration of the

rightsu created by the contract, in his

11

favor,n Dale Jack-

man released all claims he had, "for any compensation or commission, 11 as a result of the services rendered in connection
with the partnership's acquisition of the real property, or.
for uadditional servicesn which Jackman "may .. render, in the
future.
Bara ll
Plaintiff's exhibit 11-P is the second of two agreements.

It is between BARA CENTENNIAL PARK, N.V., a Nether-

lands Antilles corporation (the "Corporation 11 ) , BARA INDUSTRIAL PARK, a Utah limited partnership {the npartnershipu) and

Dale L. Jackman.

The agreement reflects the entire understanding

of the parties and can only be modified by an agreement in

a.

The original figure was later changed to $20,000.00 and
initialled by both parties.
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writing.
long.

It is also dated July 1, 1980, and is seven pages

It was prepared by Mr. Dolowitz' law firm and is signed

by all of the parties, in the case of the Bara °CorporationJ•

and

11

Partnership,

11

by Mr. Jackman's friend and associate,

Nazih M. Mahmood, as Managing Director of BARA CENTENNIAL
PARK, N.V., the

11

Corporation" and

11

General Partner."

The agreement provides that Jackman has rendered
services to the partnership, Bara Industrial Park, worth
$45,000.00 in connection with its acquisition of
proved real property in Salt Lake County.

~ertain

unim-

The defendant, Jack-

man, loaned the money back to the partnership, and received,
in lieu of interest on the loan, an assignment of 2.574%· of the
net profits of Bara Industrial Park.

Jackman was not required

to make any capital contribution to the partnership, and his
loan was not treated as a capital contribution.

Jackman did

agree, again, to be available, in consideration of the interest
assigned to.him, from time to time,

11

for consultation."

In

consideration of the "rights" created by the contract in his
"favor," Jackman released all claims

11

for any compensation 11 or

commission, connected with the partnership's acquisition of the
property for its Industrial Park, or for "additional 11 or
"future" services.
The Defendant Earned the Interests the Bara
Contracts Said He Owned
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The defendant admitted that he had dealings during
the year 1980 with the Bara Corporation (R.321,322).

He

stated, at first, that he spent ,.practi9ally no time" working
fo~

them (R.322), but later admitted that he tried to put a

deal together; that he chased back and forth·and handled negotiations for the purchase of some property at Patio Springs
in Ogden.

For his services, he conceded he was qoinq to re-

ceive an interest. in a Bara project from Nazih Mahmood (R.322)e
The defendant denied that he rendered any services to the Bara
companies in connection with the acquisition of unimproved
9
real property in Davis County (R.328).

no.

(By Mr. Allred) ••• Did you acquire

un-

improved real property in Davis County
for the Bara Corporation?
A.

I did not acquire unimproved property
for the Bara Corporation.

Q.

Did you render services for the Bara
.
Corporation
for t h e lO connec t•ion wi"th
the acquisition of the unimproved
property in Davis County?

A.

I did not.

9. Although that is precisely what exhibit 10-P says that
he did.
10.

The record here should say, •• ... in connection with ••• "
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Did you acquire real property for the

Q.

Bara Corporation in Salt Lake County?
A.

I did not acquire real property or any
other property 11 (R.330).

The defendant did testify that he may have served
the Bara people by referring them to Zions Securities Corporation, where they acquired some unimproved real property
in Salt Lake County, but denied that his services had value,
or that he had done anything.
he said.

Zions Securities ndid it all, ...

The defendant claimed that the transaction, closed

months before

th~

agreement, exhibit 11-P, was signed.

11
•••

really didn't do anything, no service was rendered .. (R.341).
On redirect, on the second day of the trial, the
defendant admitted, for the first time ever, that the Bara
Corporation purchased 16 acres of property in the North Salt
11
Lake Industrial Park for at least $28,000.00 an acre.
The
acquisition involved a purchase price of $450,000.00 to
$480,000.00, and the property was purchased from Beneficial
Development

Comp~ny

(R.397).

The Bara Corporation did purchase unimproved real
property in Davis County as exhibit 10-P said that it did.
The Bara Corporation also purchased unimproved real property

11. Future Development Company's new building is located in
the same industrial park (R.397).

22

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

I

in Salt Lake County as exhibit 11-P stated (R.398).

Mr. Jack-

man testified that he had never told anyone that he owned or
had an interest in either of those Bara projects, the one in
Salt Lake County, or the one in Davis County, but. admitted
that he

11

might have led" someone to believe that he did

(R.398).

Hoyt Wimer, the Assistant Vice-President of Surety

Life Insurance Company,·who previously worked at Bettilyon
Mortgage Loan, a friend of the defendant, one thoroughly familiar with the Future Development Company project, and the
man who arranged for Future Development's loan,

contradicte~

the claim that the defendant had no interest in Bara's North
Salt Lake project •. Mr. Wimer testified that the Bara Corporation acquired 30 acres of property in the North Salt Lake Industrial Park for $30,000.00 an acre (R.421).

He admitted

that he had written a letter to Future Development Company's
prospective-lender, Old Stone Bank, on November 16, 1979, and
had informed the lender that the Bara property in the North Salt
Lake Industrial Park was being developed with the aid and help
of Dale Jackman, who had

~

interest in the project (R.421) •.

Mr. Wimer testified that Mr. Jackman told him, as he

~hen

told

the prospective lender, that Jackman had an interest in the
Bara project at the North Salt Lake Industrial Center (R.422) •
The witness Wimer, a witness hostile to the plaintiff, conceded
that parts of the Bara project in the North Salt Lake Industrial
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Park were being patterned after the Salt Lake International
Center (R.422).

The letter to the lender, Old Stone Bank, the

one prepared by Mr. Wimer before this case was filed, is
plaintiff's exhibit 30-P.

Following the testimony of Mr. Wimer,

on those points, the court interrupted proceedings to say that
the plaintiff may have shown that the defendant lied, and
asked if it made any difference (R.425).1 2
The Bara companies purchased unimproved real estate
from two of Mr. Jackman's former employers, Beneficial Development Company and Zions Securities Corporation.

The Bara

people developed their project in the North Salt Lake Industrial
Park, with the assistance of Mr. Jackman, who shared an office
with Nazih Mahmood, following principles previously tested at
the Salt Lake International Center by the Salt Lake International Center Development Company.
The Contracts, exhibits 10-P and 11-P, define what
Mr. Jackman owned, when the case was filed.

It was manifestly

unjust for the trial judge, at the trial, to completely disregard those documents, as if they did not exist.

The agree-

ments which were executed with all requisite formalities are
valid on their face.

12. See this Brief, section IV , for further discussion of
the point.
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Exhibits 10-P and 11-P purport to increase the
defendant's alleged net worth almost once again.

The claim

that Mr. Jackman did not remember that the Bara agreements
were in writing, or that he had ever signed them (R.336), was
the only way the defendant could explain why such arrangements had not previously been disclosed, in the course of proceedings, in the Answers to Interrogatories (R •. 35), the Financial Declaration (R.103) or the defendant's deposition.
The claim that Mr. Jackman.did not remember the
existence of contracts that were legally binding and signed by
him, documents that.purported to compensate him for services
he contributed on projects Mr. Wimer said he helped to develop,
contracts with Nazih Mahmood, with whom he shared-an office, is
preposterous.

At the time this case commenced, the defendant,

Dale L. Jackman, owned the interests in the Bara projects that
the two unrefuted contracts, exhibits 10-P and 11-P, said that
he did.
The trial court erred when it found that the defendant
had no interest in Future Development Company, Bara Two Partnership Limited or the Bara Industrial Park.
POINT II
THE TRIAL JUDGE DID NOT PERMIT PLAINTIFF'S
COUNSEL TO PRESENT THE PLAINTIFF'S CASE

This case was given a special setting on the trial
calendar and the plaintiff waited more than a year to have
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the matter heard.

The plaintiff was

no~

defendant's tangled financial affairs.

familiar with the
It fell to her attor-

ney to examine hundreds of documents, and the witnesses who
were familiar with them, the defendant and his business associates.

Plaintiff's counsel informed the court, at the outset

of the trial, that the plaintiff would prove her case "with
the testimony of hostile witnesses 11 (R.204).
The defendant's attorney alleged, before the trial
began, in the Judge's chambers, as his client had previously
done, under oath, that Mr. Jackman did not own, and had never
owned, any interest in Future Development
Bara project.

~ompany,

or in any

He offered the plaintiff, both on and off the

record, any interest his client then had in Future Development
Company, in any Bara project, or in the Salt Lake International
Center.

Mr. Dolowitz agreed to give those interests to the

plaintiff, in their

ent~rety,

and to ascribe no value to them

(R.191).

The plaintiff's attorney agreed that Mrs. Jackman
would accept the proposition that the defendant had never
owned an interest in any Bara project, or in Future Development Company, if the defendant would take a polygraph

~est

on

those points, one that could be administered on the eve of the
first day of trial, and reported at the morning session the
following day.

The plaintiff's attorney had prearranged such

a test and had informed the court that the plaintiff would
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find some way to bear the cost.

Part of that discussion,

between counsel and.,the court, spilled over on the record at
the beginning of the triai. 13
Before the trial commenced, the situation, then, was
as follows:

The defendant claimed he had never owned any in-

terest in Future Development Company, or in any Bara project,
and offered to give the plaintiff any interes·t he then had.
His attorney argued that because Mr. Jackman had made such a
tender, and generously agreed to give such interests no value
in his proposal for settlement, that all testimony on those
issues should be excluded from the trial on grounds of relevance {R.191).
The plaintiff's position was that the defendant owned
an interest in Future Development Company worth $160,000.00
at the time the case was filed.

The plaintiff claimed the

defendant owned interests in Bara projects worth at least
$65,000.00, without considering the projected annual revenue.

The plaintiff did not want an in-kind share of such interest
as Mr. Jackman then had in either Bara project, or in Future
Development Company.

It was apparent that the defendant had

13. "The proposal really, basically, is this, your Honor. If
Mr. Jackman would take the polygraph test, and if he can pass
the test, we will accept his disclosure of the assets as the
record reflects them, and then the issues that remain to be
decided by the court are how should those assets that he has
disclosed be divided as between these parties..... (R.190. See
also: 189-191) •

27

Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

no interest that would benefit the plaintiff, in any of
those entities, when the case was tried.

The defendant's

"concessionn (R.191) was a cynical one, intended to foreclose
any proof about the existence or value of such interests.
The plaintiff asked the trial court to award her, in cash or
its equivalent, one-half the value of the interest the defendant had in the Bara projects, and in Future Development Company, at the time the case was filed, or just before (R.193,194).
From the moment the plaintiff refused to

accep~

the

defendant's tender, before the court had examined an exhibit,
or heard from a single witness, until the conclusion of the
foreshortened trial, the plaintiff paid a stiff price for refusing to settle the case on the defendant's terms.· The issue
was raised again and again,
"THE COURT:.

He says if you've got any

interest you £2,£ have all o.f it. You
want hal.f o.f. it. What more £2,£ !. give
you than all of it?" (R.190, emphasis
supplied.)
and,
"THE COURT: Frankly !. can't
vancy of all of this.

~the

rele-

ltMR. ALLRED:
You can't see the relevance
of these documents?

"THE COURT:

If. he's. got !!!. interest in it,

why,.yo.u're going to get it. They said you
can have it" (R.476, emphasis supplied).
and,
"THE COURT: Well, the only asset you've got
here is the house and a lot, isn't it?
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11

MR. ALLRED:

No.

,..THE COURT:. . Wel.l.,. ~- yo~' .v.e .got anything
else they said you can have iJ:.. So, the
burden is on you to prove by a preponderance of the evidence that he's got it.

"MR. ALLRED: ••• I think we've proved by
a preponderance of the proof that he has
got it.
11

.AlL .right. .And .tbey said if .
.that..aw.ar.d !.!:.· . all. .j:g ..the plaintiff.

.TBE... Co.tJRT._.:. -·

th.er.a

.~

That's exactly what they've said.Jt
emphasis supplied)
See also:

Ca.426,

R.313, lines 7 through 13.
In a clumsy effort to coerce a settlement in a case

the court did not wish to try, the trial court required plaintiff's reluctant counsel to make a proffer of proof, before
any testimony was permitted to be taken.

In that proffer,

counsel was forced to divulge, giving the defendant full fore-

warning, 14 how the plaintiff intended to prove the defendant
owned stock in Future Development Company.

The dilemma of

plaintiff's counsel, already on the defense, and the attitude
of the trial court, before a witness had spoken a word, is
reflected in the following dialogue:
'THE COURT:

Let me put it--what' s your
proffer of proof contrary to that?
Who are you going to call to testify
other than that?
1

14. The full fruits of that improvident disclosure are seen
in the defendant's evasive testimony beginning at line 24,
R. at 271, and ending on page 276 at line 25.
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MR. ALLRED: ••• !_ hesitate E2_ say ~,
as I hes,ita.ted to say at the,. pretrial,
how ~ intend to make ~ proof.
11

"THE COURT: .. You.' re before the court

~

Make your proffer.
"MR •. ALLRED.:.

.I. intend

E2_ pro.ve that Mr .•

Jackman owned 2n!_-thir.d .of Future Development Company from ~ financ.ial. s.ta.tement
writ.ten in his ~ hand given to ~bank in
connection with ~ loan for credit.
"THE COURT:
have?
"MR. ALLRED:

All right.

What else do you

I have a mountain of evidence,

your Honor, with respect to his dealings
with that corporation, the responsibilities
he had that he performed for them, how he
earned that enti.tlement .. I hate to disclose
that, because it gives them two da¥s ..... 1s
"THE COURT: l l doesn't give them two days.
~.don't have two days.
comence your case.
(R.192, emphasis supplied.)

11

The trial commenced on Thursday, November 12, 1981,
at approximately 10:30 a.m. 17 The trial court was reluctant
to permit plaintiff's counsel to make an opening statement
(R.194).

The Judge returned late on Thursday afternoon, and

15.. I have taken the liberty to correct th~ record, which
was inaccurate at this point. I have substituted the word
"hate" for the word "had", and I have indicated the interruption with ellipsis periods.
16. See in that same regard, lines 9 through 17, R. at 194,
lines 19 through 25 and lines 1 and 2, R. at 257 and 258.
17. Contrary to the assertion in the record that this case
started at 10:00 a.m. The court had an early calendar.
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the trial did not conunence on time.

18

Plaintiff's counsel

was advised, on the first trial day that the case was to be
entirely completed by 3:30 p.m. the following day, whether
.
. h e d or not. 19
th e par t ies
were f.inis

The court attempted to dispose of the unwanted case
on-jurisdictional grounds.

It said,

11

.0.you establish juris-

diction in this case or we're going to dispose of this in a
hurry."

(R. 254)

The plaintiff was not permitted sufficient time to
interrogate the witnesses.

Plaintiff's counsel spent the

short second trial day identifying and admitting the exhibits
required to support the plaintiff's claim and this appeal.
Proof of that is found in the fact that the critically important deposition of Gordon Gregson was not published at the
trial.

Plaintiff's counsel simply set aside all the careful

preparations that were made for the examination of Mr. Jackman's
associate, Mr. Gregson, an essential witness and a principal
in Future Development Company.

It was necessary to do the

same with other equally important preparations, including those

18. Contrary to the assertion in the record that court recommenced at 2:00 p.m.
19. See R. at page 478, lines 1 through 5. The testimony
concluded at 3:30 p.m. on Friday, November 13, 1981 (R.497),
and counsel and the parties went home early, without arguing
the matter. See.also: R. at 533.
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.

f or Mr • Wimer.

20

The trial court scheduled closing arguments

for Tuesday, November 17, 1981, before 10:00 a.m., so they
would not conflict with that day's agenda.
The trial judge interfered with the presentation of
the plaintiff's case.

That interference constituted a denial

of -due process and was prejudicial error.

.

Failure to consider

the pertinent facts is itself an abuse of discretion.

Kallas v.

Kallas, Utah, 614 P.2d 641 (1980).
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN REQUIRING THE
PLAINTIFF TO COLLECT HER MARITAL ESTATE
FROM THIRD PARTIES
The plaintiff_ proved that the defendant
third of the stock in Future Development Company.

owned~

The defend-

ant testified, before the trial, that he had not prepared any
statements reflecting income, expenses, assets, liabilities or
net worth (R.49, number 44, deposition, April 22, 1981, at
561 and 567.}

Those sworn representations by a man who had

been a mortgage loan officer for more than twelve years, later
proved not to be true.

The plaintiff subpoenaed the defendant's

financial records from Valley Bank and Trust Company..

Those

records, produced after the defendant's deposition was taken,

20.

Mr. Wimer's shortened testimony is found at R.413.
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and after he had answered the defendant's Interrogatories,
included a Credit Application and Personal Financial Statement,
found here as plaintiff's exhibit 15-P. 21
On exhibit 15-P, on July 25 and August 7, 1979,
approximately one year before the plaintiff's complaint was
filed, the defendant, who identified himself as a self-employed
real estate appraiser and

11

developer,.., represented to Valley

Bank, in order to acquire a $16,000.00 loan for the purchase
of real estate, that he owned one-third of the stock in Future
Development Company, and had an annual income of $50,000.00.
The Credit Application and the Personal Financial Statement
incorporated there, by reference, were prepared by the defendant in his own hand (R.36i,362).
The plaintiff proved that the vaiue of the defendant's stock in Future Development Company was $160,000.00.
On December 1, 1980, less than two months after this case was
filed, the defendant prepared a Financial Statement for Future
Development Company.

That Financial Statement is found in

record as plaintiff's exhibit 35-P.

For all intents and

21. The defendant's signature on these documents follows
this language:
"! . . . fully

understand that it is a federal
crime punishable by fine or imprisonment
or both to knowingly make any false statements concerning any of the above facts, as
applicable under the provisions of Title 18,
United States Code, Section 1014.u
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~he

purposes, all of the assets of Future Development Company
consisted of real estate.

The value of that real estate was

determined, on a statement certified as true, by the same
skilled M.A.I. appraiser who valued Antelope Island for its
owners, by the defendant, Dale L. Jackman.

The defendant

prepared exhibit 35-P, Future Development Company's Financial
Statement, as the Vice-President of the corporation.
Future Development Company's Financial Statement
was prepared for Bettilyon Mortgage Loan.

It reflected assets

of $1,068,000.00, liabilities of $590,000.00, and a net worth
of $478,800.00.

Mr. Jackman's one-third of the stock had a

value of $159,600.00 on December 1, 1980.
The trial court held that if the defendant had any
interest in Future Development Company, or in any Bara project,
the plaintiff could .. enforce" it.

If the defendant were ever

to receive anything from any of those entities,_the judge concluded that the plaintiff could come back in and ask for an
increase in alimony "based on change of position ... "

uwhy,

you can proceed directly against those entities, and that's
about what it boils down to'' (R.526,527.

See· also:

R.425-427).

In effect the court informed the impoverished plaintiff she could litigate with the Bara principals, or Future
Development Company, if she thought they controlled assets
that belonged to the marital estate.

The plaintiff was not in-

volved in the arrangements between her husband and his business

34
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.

. no posi. t.ion to prove Mr. Jackman's
co11eagues, 22 and was in

present interest in those projects, against his will, in litigation with his friends.

23

Any claim made by the plaintiff

had to be asserted without personal knowledge of the facts,
or the defendant's assistance, in the face of the defendant's
sworn denial he had ever owned an interest in any of the projects in question.

To prove her interest in those ancillary

proceedings, Mrs. Jackman would have had to ·first prove her
husband's perjury.
The trial court erred in requiring the plaintiff to
collect her marital estate from third parties.

That burden

belonged to the defendant, who controlled the arrangements,
bargained for the benefits, in the first place, and provided
the services that produced them.
A divorce court authorized to make a division of the
property, or to recognize one spouse's title or equitable
rights in property held by the other, may award the property
to one spouse and order that that spouse pay the other a sum
in cash.

That is particularly true where a transfer in kind

22. The wives of the other principals were involved. The
five permanent guarantors of the $285,000.00 loan, under the
G.uar.anty· dated. January 27, 1981, were. Robert J •. ~.tin.,.
Miriam E. Martin, Gordon s. Gregson, Betty Jane Gregson and
Dale L.-Jackman (plaintiff's exhibit 36-P, pages 5 and 6).
23. Mr. Mahmood could not be served or deposed in these proceedings (R.483) •
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is impractical, or does not bring about a fair and equitable
result.

The plaintiff has no way of knowing what arrange-

ments the defendant made with respect to his stock in Future
Development Company, or regarding his interests in_ the Bara
projects, or how he now intends to receive those assets.
24
defendant knows.

The

If a defendant sells, transfers, or conceals an
asset that belongs to both parties, during the pendency of
divorce proceedings, and does not share the proceeds, the
trial court may require payment in cash, or an adjustment of
properties, in any final settlement.

Persons guilty of such

conduct would remain fully liable to any party whose interest
was adversely affected.
The plaintiff asked the court to award her one-half
the value of the assets described at the trial, in cash.
Where the principal assets were shares of stock in corporations,
or percentage interests in limited partnerships, the success

24. In Boyce v. Boyce, Utah 609 P.2d 928 (1980), the defendant represented to the plaintiff that his net worth was approximately $200,000.00 arid the plaintiff relied on those figures when she agreed to settle for $100,000.00. After the
parties settled, the defendant gave substantially different
information on a loan application where he claimed a net worth
of $1,154,690.10. The defendant included the assets of corporations he had previously transferred to his parents, and in
which he previously indicated, he had no stock. This court
reversed the trial court and remanded the case for reconsideration.
In the Boyce case,· it appeared that the defendant's
parents held the stock, for him, until the case was settled.
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of which were in some degree attributable to the defendant's
25
continued management,
the actual assets, the shares of stock
and the partnership percentages, should have been awarded to
the husband, with the wife receiving her share in cash.
The trial court erred when it required the plaintiff
to collect her marital estate from· third parties.

Further-

more, the property settlement was, in other respects, inequitable. 26

The court failed to discharge its duty in the matter

of making a fair division of the property.

The apportionment

of the property was so manifestly unjust as to indicate a clear
abuse of

discre~ion.

Turner v. Turner, Utah, 649 P.2d 6 (1982).
POINT IV

THE TRIAL COURT MISUNDERSTOOD AND MISAPPLIED THE LAW
During the course of the trial, the judge indicated,
in a number of important respects, that his understanding of
the law did not accord with the recent decisions of this court,
and with the laws. and statutes of the State of Utah.
there has been a misunderstanding or misapplication

When
o~

the law,

resulting in prejudicial error, and when the ends of justice
require it to do so, this court may review the evidence, make
\

25.

See paragraphs 7, plaintiff's exhibits 10-P and 11-P.

26. The court awarded the defendant a $10,000.00 lien, against
the home, and the entire equity in the lot in Davis County.
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its own findings and substitute its judgment for that of the
trial court.
See also:

Harding v. Harding 26 Utah 2d 277, 488 P.2d 277.

Mitchell v. Mitchell, Utah, 527 P.2d 1359 (1974).
The trial court failed to correctly interpret or

apply the law in the following particulars:
Child Support
Before the trial began, before the matter was ever
discussed, before the first witness testified or an opening
statement was made, the court ruled as follows:
"THE COURT:
.•. The issue of the child is
out. I don't know whether you've told your
client or not, but he has attained majority.
Any right to support is his and not yours
in absence of mental incapacity. So you
don't have to worry about child support in
this case .. (R.194).
The parties' son, Steven Jackman, then 18 years of
age, had a physical rather than mental incapacity.

The trial

court cut short and refused to permit testimony pertaining
to Steven Jackman's physical incapacity, although Mrs. Jackman
did testify that he suffered from dyslexia and Crohn's disease
(R.239) and-required special medications (R.229).

The record

does not reflect the details of Steven Jackman's incapacity,
or spell out his need for special care.

The court refused to

permit any testimony about Steven Jackman's ability to support
himself (R.239).
Those rulings, consistent with the trial court's
persistent efforts to foreshorten the trial, did not correctly
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interpret or apply the law, and were in error.
15-2-1

u.c.A.

Section

does not limit the right of child support after

the age of 18 to cases of mental incapacity, as the court
presumed, and the court's asswnption, in that regard, as
stated in the record, was clearly erroneous.
Once that special or unusual circwnstances are

•

found, the court may, in its discretion, order child support
to age 2i.

Section 15-2-1 U.C.A. Ferguson v. Ferguson, Utah

578 P.2d 1274 (1978), Fletcher v. Fletcher, Utah 615 P.2d
1218 (1980). 27 It is an abuse of discretion for the court to
order child support, beyond the age of 18, unless it makes
special findings concerning the need for such support.
Fletcher v. Fletcher, supra.

It was an abuse of discretion,

in this case, not to permit any testimony about special or
unusual circumstances that would have supported an award, beyond the age of 18, for Steven Jackman.
Alimony
The trial judge recited his understanding of the
iaw of alimony, on
. the record, a number of times, always in
the following terms:

27. If a son or daughter is incapacitated, cannot earn a
living or is without sufficient means of self support, the
c·ourt can order support for so long as any ·obligation to do
so continues to exist under the law. The Uniform Civil Liability for Support Act, section 78-45, provides a parental
obligation. of support for a son or daughter of any age, where
the person is incapacitated and without means of self support.
Kiesel v. Kiesel, Utah, 619 P.2d 1374 (1980).
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"THE COURT: In absence of personal £.Q!!.duct to the· contrary she's entitled to
alimony. I'll tell you that right now.
Twenty years, 22 years is enough to
establish that" (R.195, emphasis supplied).
and again,
.

.

Q. MR. ALLRED: Now, what does it mean
to say that you were a detail draftsman?
11

"THE COURT: It really doesn't matter. She's
entitled to alimony. I'll t.ell yo.u that,
in absence of conduct that would cut her
off of alimOily, and I'll asswne that that's
not present in this case. You've laid
sufficient grounds.
(R.213, emphasis supplied.)
11

Both of the foregoing recitals were early in the
trial, before the defendant put on his own case.
In English v. English, Utah, 565 P.2d 409 (1977)
this court held that the purpose of alimony is to provide support for the wife.

Alimony was not intended to reward the

wife, or penalize her husband.

In Gramme v. Gramme, Utah,

587 P.2d 144 (1979), the defendant.'s attorney contended that
he was entitled to put on evidence of plaintiff's misconduct,
not only to establish grounds for divorce, but for the purpose
of determining whether the plaintiff's right to alimony or
marital property should be forfeited or reduced.

The trial

court ruled that when the parties had established grounds
that entitled them to a divorce, that the degree of fault was
of no further concern.

This court, in the Gramme case, re-

stating the proposition that alimony was neither a penalty nor
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•

a reward, and affirming the trial court, stated that the
£unction of alimony was to provide support for the wife as

nearly as possible at the standard of living she enjoyed during the marriage and to prevent her from becominq a public
charge.

Those principles were recently reasserted in

Bushell v. Bushell, Utah, 649 P.2d·85 (1982).
rt is perfectly clear that the trial court, in the
instant case, assumed that the personal conduct of the plaintiff was a factor to be considered on the issue of alimony
(R.195), and that misconduct could cut alimony off (R.213).
Those propositions, which were applied by this court, as the
law, until recently, made the personal conduct of the wife a
factor to be considered, not only to establish grounds, but
a~so

to determine whether the plaintiff's right to alimony

should be forfeited or reduced.

The trial court's understanding

of those points in this case, however, did not correctly reflect the law of the State of Utah at the time the case was
tried.

English v. English, supra at 411, Gramme v. Gramme,

supra at 157.
The award of alimony, in this case, was made by a
judge who misunderstood the law and said so on the record.
The alimony award was not based on the standard of
living the plaintiff enjoyed, during the marriage, and constituted an inequitable share of the defendant's historical
earnings.

The Decree left the plaintiff without health and
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accident insurance, or the means to acquire it, and made it
impossible for her to reconstruct her life on a happy and
useful basis.
While the court assumed, at the beginning of the
case, that conduct that could cut off or reduce alimony was
not present (R.213), it is not certain that the same assumption was later indulged, after the defendant testified.

This

much is certain, the trial judge misunderstood the law and
the alimony award was inadequate.
The Division of Marital Assets
During the foreshortened testimony of Hoyt S. Wimer,
it became quite apparent there were serious conflicts between
the testimony of Mr. Wimer and that of the defendant.

At

that time the court interrupted proceedings and said,
"THE COURT:
... Maybe you have shown that
he' s lied. Does. it make any difference even
if. he'd have made a million dollars out of
thes.e things. that you ' re going in to SO--much.
I.sn 't the issue at this. time what--the need
for aliiii'Ony and the ability to ~?And
even if your contention is true, if he receives some benefit in the future out of it, .
isn't that a basis for you to come in and
ask for an increase in alimony?
(R.425,426,
emphasis supplied)
11

The trial court, as that recital shows, made no
distinction between the plaintiff's claim for alimony and the
plaintiff's claim to an equitable share of the assets acquired
during the period of the marriage.

The issue under discussion

when the court interrupted counsel, on the record, at page
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425, was not alimony.

The court supposed that whatever the

defendant had gotten out of those

11

things 11 the plaintiff had

gone into "so much, .. and whatever he stood to acquire later,·
was important to the plaintiff only in the. context of her
need, in other words, on the· issue of alimony.

if the defendant had made

~a

Her recourse,

million dollars, 11 according to

the court, was to come back in and ask for an increase in
alimony based on t•change of circumstancesjl (R.426,427).
The trial court's response to the frustration of
plaintiff's counsel, at that confusion, was to advise counsel
to report the defendant to the Internal Revenue Service.
They, he said, ffwill dig it up for youu (R.427).
The award of alimony should not be included as a
marital asset when the distribution of assets is made at the
end of the case.
(1980).

Fletcher v. Fletcher, Utah, 615 P.2d 1218

There is a distinction between the division of assets

accumulated during the

marri~ge,

which are to be distributed

upon an equitable basis, and the post marital duty of support
and maintenance.

English v. English, Utah, 565 P.2d 409 (1977)

The court confused the distinction between alimony
and marital assets, and failed to differentiate between earnings and proceeds received from the sale or distribution of
assets.

The court confused the distinction between a division

of the marital estate and the duty of post marital support.
The plaintiff's claim to one-half the cash value of the
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e

defendant's interest in Future Development Company, and in
the Bara projects, based on values established by the defendant, was not a claim for alimony.
It was cynical, unjust, and legally incorrect to
suggest that it didn't matter if the defendant lied, even if
he made a million dollars, because of it, as long as the
plaintiff.got her alimony.

Once the defendant had the interests

that plaintiff's exhibits 10-P, 11-P and 15-P prove that he
did, whether he had liquidated them, by the time the case was
tried, and already received the proceeds, whether they were
held, for him, by someone else, 28 to be received later, in
some other way or through some other entity, or somehow otherwise deferred, made no difference.

The plaintiff was entitled

to an equitable share of the assets acquired during the marriage, whatever the defendant had done with them, without regard to the defendant's additional duty to provide post marital
support and maintenance.
The trial court misunderstood and misapplied the
law as it applied to child support, to alimony and the division of assets.

This court, considering all of that, should

take appropriate corrective action.

Watson v. Watson,. Utah,

561 P.2d 1072 (1977).

28.

As in Boyce v. Boyce, Utah, 609 P.2d 928 (1980).
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POINT V
THE TRIAL JUDGE WAS NOT PREPARED TO TRY
THE PLAINTIFF'S CASE
The trial judge was not feeling-well when the
plaintiff's case was tried.

Although the written transcript

cannot directly reflect that, it is nevertheless true.

The

judge ascended and left the Bench, slowly, in apparent pain.
He frequently listened to the testimony with his eyes closed,
shielded by his.hand, and with his head down.

He seldom

watched the witnesses, failed to start court on time, took a
long break every hour and was extremely irritable.
The judge read and examined complex exhibits, during the trial, while the witnesses were being interrogated,
and refused time and time again, to permit counsel to offer
any explanation about the documents that were being admitted.
The court's response to the plaintiff's efforts to put the
exhibits in perspective, or

e~lain

document speaks for itself

(R.327,328,372,410,421,438,465,

466) •

11

them, was always, "The

"I read them" he said, · .. as they come in.

1129

2.9. The documents that were read while the witnesses were
interrogated were not always understood. The discussion at
R.437 and 438 makes the point. After reading plaintiff's
exhibi.t 36-P, while ~. Wimer testified, the court concluded,
out loud, that Mr. Jackman had personally guaranteed the
construction loan on Future Development Company's North Salt
Lake Project in March of 1980, but not the permanent loan in
January of 1981. That conclusion was stated as follows:
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There were times when the court refused to admit
evidence to which no objection was nia.de (R.338).

The judge

made few notes, and had put the exhibits away, in the evidence
room, long before the case was decided two months after the
trial.

The judge had to call counsel back, to clarify for-

gotten details, before he was able to rule on January 7, 1982
(R.531-537).
The plaintiff had important issues at stake in this
litigation.

Litigants should not be required to try lawsuits

in front of judges who do not want to hear the evidence and
don't feel good.

While safeguarding the trial judge's repu-

tation is a vital

co~sideration,

one more important, certainly,

than counsel's perception of his judicial performance, the
matter involves, in the final analysis, the protection of the
integrity of the public interest.

"THE COURT: Well, the documents speak
for themselves. The one he signed as a
guarantor is a construction loan and this
one he doesn't sign individually. It's
on the trust deed. And he signs as an
officer of the corporation. 0
(R.437)
Only when plaint1ff 's counsel approached the bench, and
pointed to the Guarantee on pages 5 and 6 of plaintiff's
exhibit 36-P, did the court admit that Mr. Jackman personally
guaranteed the permanent loan (R.438) . On other occasions
during the interrogation of witnesses, the judge read complex
exhibits, but said nothing.
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POINT VI
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT FAILED TO
AWARD THE PLAINTIFF REASONABLE ATTORNEY'S
FEES

At the time of the trial, the plaintiff had been
home for 23 years (R.212).

Mrs. Jackman, who had not been em-

ployed since 1958, testified she had lost her employment skills
and the court agreed {R.213).

The plaintiff totally depended

upon the defendant for her own livelihood.

When Mrs. Jack-

rnan' s attorney testified about his fees, he had already worked
nearly 190 hours, and had advanced costs, for her, in the
amount of $1,593.50.

No part of the fees, and none of the

costs, had then been paid.
The trial court awarded $1,500.00 in attorney's fees
(R.157); and $1,066.65, against the costs (R.171).
Section 30-3-5 u.c.A. 1953 permits an award to the
wife, or to a husband, of money with which to prosecute, or
defend, an action in divorce.

Such an award is particularly

appropriate in those cases where the adverse party, usually
the wife, is destitute or practically so.

Such an award is

also appropriate, in the sound discretion of the court, when
the circumstances of the parties are such that in fairness to
the wife, she should be given financial assistance by the
husband in her prosecution or defense of the action.
Weiss, 111

u.

353, 179 P.2d 1005.
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Weiss v.

Mrs. Jackman, at the time of the trial, was destitute, or practically so, and unable to pay her attorney (R.250).
The alimony awarded by the court was less than the plaintiff
required to support herself and Steven Jackman.

The financial

circumstances of the parties have historically had an important
bearing on issues relative to attorney's fees and court costs,
and are critical in determining whether an award should be made.
"The reason for permitting 2:. wife
suit mo.nay to defend. an action for divor.ce
rests Q!l the ground that the wife normally
has lli2. s.eparate estate from which to ~
for bringing~ defending the action ... "
Alldredge v. Alldredge 119 Utah 504, 229 P.2d
681, emphasis supplied.
The facts in this matter clearly support the award
of reasonable attorney's fees to the plaintiff.

This case

required extensive discovery necessitated by the defendant's
conduct.

The failure to award reasonable fees, under the

circumstances in this case, was so manifestly unjust and inequitable as to constitute an abuse of discretion.
The court's refusal to award reasonable fees to
Mrs. Jackman, or to others like her, ie extremely bad policy.
What attorney will represent a wife with no income, ·or prospects, one who knows nothing of her husband's financial affairs, in an enormously difficult case like this one was, and
in the way the facts require, if it is known in advance, that
the fees will not be paid.
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·POINT Vl:I
THE PLAINTIFF SHOULD BE AWARDED HER
ATTORNEY''S FEES AND COSTS FOR Tins APPEAL
The decision below made this appeal necessary.

If

the judgment of the trial court is reversed, or even if it is
not, the plaintiff should receive an adequate award for the
services of her counsel in the lower court and for this appeal.
·This court has held that reasonable attorney's fees may be
awarded on appeal.

Carter v. carter, Utah, 584 P.2d 904 (1978);

Dahlberg v. Dahlberg 77 U. 157, 292 P. 214: Peterson v. Peterson
112 U. 542, 189 P.2d 961; Hendricks v. Hendricks 91 U. 564,
65 P.2d 642.
CONCLUSION
The plaintiff presented evidence intended to show
that the defendant-respondent owned assets that were not disclosed in the parties' divorce proceedings.

The trial court

refused to permit the plaintiff to properly present her case,
and found, in the face of overwhelming evidence to the contrary, that the defendant had never had an interest in Future
Development company, in Bara Two Partnership· Limited, or the
Bara Industrial Park.

The trial court undervalued the defend-

ant's assets and income,

asc~ibed

no value to the defendant's

appraisal business, divided the property inequitably, provided
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insufficient alimony and no support for the parties' son,
and refused.to award adequate attorney's fees.
The evidence preponderated against the court's findings of fact and the legal results that followed from them.
When the evidence clearly preponderates against the trial
-

court's findings, when the judgment so fails to do equity
that it manifests a clear abuse of discretion, this court is
authorized to make the necessary corrections.
Counsel requests, if the matter must be remanded,
that it be remanded to the trial calendar rather than the
judge who handled the trial.
Respectfully submitted,

JOEL M•. ALLRED

500 American Savings Building
61 South Main Street
Salt Lake City, Utah 84111
Attorney for Plaintiff-Appellant
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